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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARIO B. BELTRAN,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 960079-CA

vs.
DENISE ALLAN; LDS SOCIAL SERVICES,
an Agency of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints; and
JOHN DOES I THROUGH V,

Priority No. 2
Defendants/Appellees.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals Court has original jurisdiction
of this matter in accordance with Article VIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution of Utah and Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(k) (1994 as
Amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal relates to the trial court's action
in granting
Appellant

the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

contends

that

the

trial

court

committed

The

error

in

granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and relies
upon three lines of reasoning to support his position.
1.

The Trial Court Committed Error in Ruling that there
were no Material Facts Precluding the Granting of
Summary Judgment.

The

Appellant

response

to

preserved

this

the Defendants' Motion

issue
for

for

appeal

Summary

in

his

Judgment

and

affidavit (R. 227-259).
Because

summary

judgment

by definition

does not

resolve

factual

issues,

an

appellate

challenge

to

the

granting

summary judgment presents only questions of law for review.
conclusions
deference

of

law

are

to the trial

reviewed

for

The

correctness, with

court's determination.

Country

of

no

Oaks

Condominium Management Comm. v. Jones, 851 P.2d 640, 641 (Utah
1993); Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d
798, 800 (Utah 1992); Perkins v. Great-Western Assurance Company,
814 P.2d

1125 (Utah Ct. Ap. 1991); Transamerica Cash Reserve,

Inc. v. Dixie Power and Water, Inc., 798 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990).
The appellate court is to consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the losing party and affirms "only where it
appears that there is no genuine issue of fact, or where, even
according

to the facts as contended by the losing party, the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Supply v.

Saurini, 775 P.2d

420, 421

Seagull Enter., Inc., 595 P.2d

(Utah

526, 528-29

1989);

D & L

Themy v.

(Utah 1979).

The

nondeferential standard of review also applies to the threshold
issue of whether there are no material issues of fact such that
summary judgment is in order.

Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. Corp.

v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App. 1992).
2.

Did the Trial Court Error in Ruling, as a Matter of
Law, that the Appellant was not Excused from Filing
a Notice of Paternity by the "Impossibility" Exception
as Formulated in Ellis v. Social Services Department,
615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980) and Utah Code Annotated
78-30-4.8 (Supp. 1994).

The Appellant reserved the issue for appellate review in his
response to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and in
his affidavit filed in connection therewith (R. 227-259).
2

The conclusions of law made by the trial court in applying
Ellis are reviewed

for correctness, with no difference to the

trial courtT s conclusions.
Comm.

v.

Jones,

851

P.2d

Country Oaks Condominium Management
640,

641

(Utah

1993);

Allen

v.

Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah
1992); Perkins v. Great-Western Assurance Company, 814 P.2d 1125
(Utah Ct. Ap. 1991); Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie
Power and Water, Inc., 798 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990).
3.

Did the Trial Court Commit Error in Ruling, as a Matter
of Law, that the Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals,
in the Matter of the Adoption of W, 275 Utah Adv. Rep.
20 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), is Dispositive of the Issues
in this Case and, As Applied to the Facts of this Case,
is the Utah Adoption Statute, Requiring the Filing
of a Notice of Paternity, Constitutional.

The Appellate

reserved his right to challenge

the

trial

courtf s findings on appeal in his response to the DefendantsT
Motion for Summary Judgment and in his affidavit filed with the
court (R. 227-259).
The issue raised herein is a question of law.

The appellate

court is not obligated to give deference to the trial court's
conclusions of law but reviews them for correctness.

Western

Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744
P.2d 1376, 1377-78 (Utah 1987).
DISPOSITIVE STATUTES
The interpretation of Utah Code Annotated 78-30-4.8 (1994)
is important in resolving the issues on appeal in this matter.
(l)(a) Any person who is the father or claims to
be the father of a child born outside of marriage may
file notice of his claim of paternity and of his
willingness and intent to support the child to the best
3

of his ability with the state registrar of vital
statistics in the Department of Health . . .
(2) The notice may be filed prior to the birth
of the child but must be filed prior to the time the
child was relinquished to a licensed child placing
agency or prior to the filing of a petition by a
person with whom the mother has placed the child for
adoption . . .
(3) The Legislature finds that a certain degree
of finality is necessary in order to facilitate the
state's interest in expediting the adoption of
young children and in protecting the rights and
interests of the child, the birth mother, and the
adoptive parents. Therefore, a putative father who
fails to file his notice of paternity is barred from
thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to
assert any interest in the child unless he proves by
clear and convincing evidence that:
(A) It was not possible for him to file
a notice of paternity within the period of time
specified in Subsection (2);
(B) His failure to file a notice of
paternity was through no fault of his own; and
(C) He filed a notice of paternity within
10 days after it became possible for him to
file.
(4) Except as provided in Subsection 78-30-4.1(4)
failure to file a timely notice of paternity shall be
deemed to be a waiver a surrender of any right to
notice of any hearing in any judicial proceeding for
adoption of the child, and the consent of that person
to the adoption of the child is not required . . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff

filed

this action

to

assert

his parental

rights to a child born to the Defendant Denise Allan and given up
for adoption by her through the Defendant L.D.S. Social Services.
A.
1.
11,

1995

Procedural Chronology of the Case.
The Plaintiff's Verified Complaint was filed on January
(R. 1-21).

The Defendants
4

answered

the

Plaintiff's

Complaint on January 30, 1995 (R. 25-29).
2.

The Plaintiff sent his first discovery to the Defendants

on February 17, 1995 (R. 30).

The Defendants responded to the

discovery on March 27, 1995 (R. 35-37).

The Plaintiff filed a

Motion to Compel on April 4, 1995 (R. 38-44).
3.

The

Defendants

filed

a Motion

to Assert

Exclusive

Jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act on
May 12, 1995 (R. 50-157).
4.

On May

12, 1995, the Defendants

filed a Motion

for

Joinder of Adoptive Parents (R. 158-166).
5.

On June 2, 1995, a Notice to Submit for Decision was

submitted to the trial court for a determination of Plaintiff's
Motion to Compel, Defendants' Motion under UCCJA and Defendants'
Motion for Joinder of Adoptive Parents (R. 168-169).

On August

15, 1995, the court entered its ruling denying Plaintiff's Motion
to Compel and granting the motions filed by the Defendants (R.
170-171).

An Order interpreting the court's ruling was filed on

August 30, 1995 (R. 172-174).
6.

The Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on

September
response

27, 1995
to

the

(R.

177-226).

Defendants' Motion

October 12, 1995 (R. 227-259).
filed

their

The

Plaintiff

for

Summary

filed

Judgment

his
on

Counsel for the adoptive parents

response on October

20, 1995

(R. 262-263).

The

Defendants filed their Reply Memorandum on October 23, 1995 (R.
264-278).
7.

On November 14, 1995, the trial court denied Plaintiff's
5

Request

for Oral

Argument

and entered

its Ruling which

was

subsequently incorporated into an Order dated November 30, 1995
(R. 284-288).

In relevant part, the court ruled as follows:

. . . The Court, having reviewed the file,
considered the memoranda of counsel, and being fully
advised in the premises, hereby orders as follows:
1.

There is no material issue of fact.

2. Defendants are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law because (a) plaintiff has made
no efforts to file a notice of claim of paternity
with the Utah Department of Health; (b) plaintiff
is barred from asserting any interest in the child
and has no right of consent to the child's
adoption. Utah Code Annotated 78-30-4.8 (1994
Supp.); and (c) the recent case of In re
Adoption of W., 275 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah App.
1995), is directly on point in rejecting
plaintiff's legal claims.
3. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
is granted.
4. Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment is denied.
5. Plaintiff's request for oral argument
is denied, pursuant to Rule 4-501(c)(b), Code
of Jud. Admin., because "the issue . . .
governing the granting [of summary judgment]
has been authoritatively decided."
R. 287.
8.

The Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal on December 29,

1995 (R. 291-292).
B.
1.
of

Statement of Facts.
The Plaintiff was born on November 27, 1974, is 21 years

age and has

continually

been

a resident of

the State of

California (Beltran affidavit, para. 2, R. 234).
2.

The Defendant Denise Allan was 20 years old when she

6

filed

her

affidavit

in

October

of

1995

and was

likewise

a

resident of the State of California, residing with her parents
(Allan affidavit, para. 2, R. 212).
3.
in

1993

The Plaintiff and Defendant agree that they began dating
and

as a result

of their romantic

involvement,

the

Defendant Denise Allan became pregnant (Beltran affidavit para.
3, R. 233; Allan affidavit para. 3, R. 212).
4.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant Allan further agree that

in approximately March of 1994, one month into the pregnancy,
Allan informed the Plaintiff that she was pregnant and that the
Plaintiff was the father (Beltran affidavit at para. 4, R. 233;
Allan affidavit at para. 3, R. 212).
5.

The Plaintiff contends that in May of 1994, he broke up

with Allan and for the first time discussed the possible adoption
of

the child.

period he
adoption

The Plaintiff

a

three-day

argued with Allan, told her he would not

agree to

and that he wanted

contends that over

the child

(Beltran affidavit

at

para. 5, R. 233). Allan acknowledges that adoption was discussed
and does not contend that the Plaintiff ever agreed to adoption.
Allan does not contest that the Plaintiff, at all times, refused
to

agree

to adoption

and manifested

his intent to raise the

expected child (Allan affidavit, paragraphs 3-5, R. 212).
6.

The Plaintiff contends that he remained friends with

Allan until she "disappeared sometime in August of 1994" (Beltran
affidavit para. 6, R. 233).
7.

Allan contends that in June of 1994, approximately four
7

months into the pregnancy, she contacted LDS Social Services in
California

regarding

the placement

(Allan affidavit para. 5, R. 212).
of

1994 she requested

of her baby

for

adoption

Allan contends that in July

the Plaintiff

to complete

a background

information form given her by LDS Social Services in California
to be used in placing the baby for adoption
para.

5, R.

212).

Plaintiff

acknowledges

(Allan affidavit
that

he

received

adoption papers from Allan in August or September of 1994.
Plaintiff

refused

regarding

medical

to

sign them but did

and

social

background

fill out
in case

The

information
of

medical

complications (Beltran affidavit para. 7, R. 233). A copy of the
forms that were completed by the Plaintiff were made part of the
Court's file.

The cover sheet for the forms, which fails to

include any heading of the agency or persons preparing the form,
provides as follows:
This BACKGROUND INFORMATION form is designed
to provide you and us with a tool wherein
significant social and medical information about
your child's heritage is collected. If you plan
adoption for your child, the identifying information
you supply will be kept confidential. General
information will be shared with your child's
new family. If you have chosen to raise this child,
you may wish to use this form to preserve information
about yourself and the child's mother for future
use . . . . (Emphasis added).
R. 203-208.
8.

Thereafter, the Plaintiff continued to make plans to

become a single parent (Beltran affidavit para. 9, R. 233).
9.

The Plaintiff contends that he was never told that Allan

had plans to go to Utah and specifically was not told by Allan

8

that she was leaving (Beltran affidavit para. 11, R. 232).

In

Allan's affidavit, she indicates that on August 15, 1994, she
left California for Utah where she planned to complete her
pregnancy (Allan affidavit para. 6, R. 211).
10.

The Plaintiff

contends that he did not learn of

Allan's departure to Utah until late October of 1994. On October
27, 1994, the LDS Social Services sent a letter to the Plaintiff,
which provided as follows:
This letter is to inform you that Denise Allan
is being assisted by this agency in making an
adoption plan for her child which is due to be
delivered the end of November 1994. She has named
you as a possible father of her unborn child . . .
Thank you for the background information we
have already completed. It would be helpful if
you could complete the family history pages and the
WAIVER (in duplicate) signed in the presence of a
notary. A self-addressed stamped enveloped is
enclosed for your convenience.
R. 249, Beltran affidavit para. 12, R. 232.
11.

The Plaintiff, upon receiving the letter from LDS

Social Services, wrote a letter, dated November 3, 1994, to
Beverly Bekker which states as follows:
. Please be advised
that I have filed a
Complaint to Establish a Paternal Relationship
requesting custody of our unborn child in the Superior
Court of California, Case No. PF000505.
I do not intend to give up any of my paternal
rights to this child, and, after blood testing, if the
child proves to be mine, I intend to pursue custody as
vigorously as possible.
I am enclosing a copy of the action filed here on
October 26, 1994, and Denise Allan will be served with
this action as quickly as that can be arranged.
If you have any questions, please contact me.
9

R. 184, Beltran affidavit para. 12; R. 232.
The Plaintiff also attempted to telephone the author of the
Social

Services

Plaintiff

and

letter,

but

accordingly,

Beverly
the

Bekker

Plaintiff

hung
did

up on

not

the

have

an

opportunity to discuss all of the issues of the adoption with her
(Beltran affidavit para. 16, R. 231; R. 273). Beverly R. Bekker
in her affidavit filed with the court does not dispute that the
Plaintiff

attempted

affidavit, R.

to

131-133).

discuss

the

case

with

her

(Bekker

The Plaintiff then corresponded

with

Bekker f s supervisor, Richard E. Black and forwarded a letter to
him dated December 11, 1994.

The Plaintiff received a letter

from Mr. Black refusing to provide any information and indicating
that the adoption had been completed in November, 1994 (R. 1;
Beltran affidavit paragraphs 16, 17, R. 231).
12.

Allan acknowledges that she received a letter from the

Plaintiff's mother toward the end of October indicating that both
the Plaintiff and his family intended to take the child (R. 200202, Allan affidavit para. 6, R. 224).
13.

On October 26, 1994, the Plaintiff filed a paternity

action in California seeking sole legal and physical custody of
the child (R. 193-199, Beltran affidavit para. 13, R. 232).

A

copy of the California Summons, Restraining Order and Complaint
were sent to Allan in Utah on November 3, 1994 and received by
her, as shown by the Certified Mail receipt, on November 7, 1994
(R. 192, 199).

The Restraining Order, issued by the California

Court specifically provided:
10

You [Allan] and the other party are restrained
from removing the minor child or children for whom
this action seeks to establish a parent-child
relationship from the state without the prior
written consent of the other or an order of the
Court.
These restraining orders are effective against
Petitioner upon filing a Petition and against
Respondent on personal service of the Summons and
Petition or on waiver and acceptance of service
by responding.
They are effective until the final decree is
entered, the Petition is dismissed, or the Court
makes a further order . . . •
R. 245.
14.

On November 14, 1994, Allan gave birth to a baby girl

in a Utah County hospital.
Relinquishment

and

On November 17, 1995, Allan signed a

Consent

for

Adoption

(Allan

affidavit

paragraphs 11-12, R. 210; R. 191).
15.

On November 25, 1994, Allan returned

to

California

where she resides with her parents and attends college

(Allan

affidavit para. 13, R. 210).
16.

On January 11, 1995, the present action was filed and

on January 12, 1995, Plaintiff requested the entry of default
against Allan in the California Court (R. 154).

The default was

ultimately set aside by the stipulation of the parties and based
upon the filing of the Utah action, the California matter was
dismissed on June 23, 1995 (R. 175-176).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is the Plaintiff's position that there are significant
issues

of

fact

that have been

affidavits filed in this case.

created

by

the pleadings

and

The existence of those material
11

issues of fact establishes that the trial court committed error
in granting summary judgment.
The facts established by the Plaintiff in this case meet the
requirements set out in statute and case law for the application
of the impossibility exception to the required filing of a Notice
of Paternity.
sufficient

It is submitted that the Plaintiff has established

issues of

fact

to entitle

him

to

an

evidentiary

hearing at which time he could establish that it was impossible
for him to file a Paternity Notice within the required time frame
and the impossibility was created through no fault of his own.
Finally,

a rational

interpretation of Ellis, due process

requirements and the adoption statute mandate a finding that a
strict interpretation of the adoption statute and the requirement
that a notice be filed within ten days after it becomes possible
is not fundamentally fair as applied to the facts of this case.
Accordingly, the fact finder should be allowed to consider all of
the facts and particularly all of the efforts the Plaintiff took
to establish his parental rights.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE PRESENCE OF DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT
AND THE IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE LAW PRECLUDES
THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a party is entitled to an order granting summary judgment
only if:

The p l e a d i n g s , d e p o s i t i o n s ,
answers
i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and admissions on f i l e , together
with t h e a f f i d a v i t s , i f any, show t h a t t h e r e i s
genuine i s s u e as t o any material f a c t and t h a t the
12

to
no

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. (Emphasis added.)
The first issue in determining the propriety of the granting
of

summary

judgment

is whether

material issues of fact.

or

not

there

are

disputed

In reviewing that issue, this Court

considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing
party and affirms the granting of summary judgment "only where it
appears that there is no genuine issue as to any material issues
of fact, or where, even according to the facts as contended by
the losing party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah
1989); Themy v. Seagull Enter., Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah
1979); Ward Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Company,814 P.2d
1125 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

In reviewing the case to determine

the presence of disputed material facts, the determination of the
trial

court

is given

no

deference

by

the

appellate

court.

Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193,
1196 (Utah App. 1992).
The second issue relates to a review of the trial court's
application of the law to the facts.
the

conclusions

according

any

of the trial
deference

court

to the

The appellate court reviews
for correctness,

trial

court's

without

determination.

Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991); Country
Oaks Condominium Management Comm. v. Jones, 851 P.2d

640, 641

(Utah 1993); Allen v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co.,
839 P.2d 798. 800 (Utah 1992); Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994).
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POINT II: THE APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF
PATERNITY IS EXCUSED BY THE "IMPOSSIBILITY" EXCEPTION
TO THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS,
A.

An Exception to Filing a Notice
Preserved by Utah Statutes.

U.C.A.

78-30-4.8

(1994) establishes

of

the

Paternity

is

requirement

of

filing a Notice of Paternity by a person who claims to be the
father of a child born out of marriage.

The statute, which was

amended in 1990 to reflect recent decisions of Appellate Courts,
specifically

delineates

the rights of unmarried

fathers.

In

relevant part, the statute provides as follows:
(l)(a) Any person who is the father or claims to
be the father of a child born outside of marriage may
file notice of his claim of paternity and of his
willingness and intent to support the child to the best
of his ability with the state registrar of vital
statistics in the Department of Health . . .
(2) The notice may be filed prior to the birth
of the child but must be filed prior to the time the
child was relinquished to a licensed child placing
agency or prior to the filing of a petition by a
person with whom the mother has placed the child for
adoption . . .
(3) The Legislature finds that a certain degree
of finality is necessary in order to facilitate the
state? s interest in expediting the adoption of
young children and in protecting the rights and
interests of the child, the birth mother, and the
adoptive parents. Therefore, a putative father who
fails to file his notice of paternity is barred from
thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to
assert any interest in the child unless he proves by
clear and convincing evidence that:
(A) It was not possible for him to file
a notice of paternity within the period of time
specified in Subsection (2);
(B) His failure to file a notice of
paternity was through no fault of his own; and
(C) He filed a notice of paternity within
14

10 days after it became possible for him to
file,
(4) Except as provided in Subsection 78-30-4.1(4)
failure to file a timely notice of paternity shall be
deemed to be a waiver a surrender of any right to
notice of any hearing in any judicial proceeding for
adoption of the child, and the consent of that person
to the adoption of the child is not required . . . .
(Emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Plaintiff, a putative father, who failed to
file a Notice of Paternity, prior to the birth of the child
(November 14, 1994) and prior to the date that the natural
mother, Allan, relinquished her rights to the child (November 17,
1994), must establish that it was not possible for him to file
the Notice of Paternity through no fault of his own.
B.

Utah Case Law Created the "Impossibility" Exception to
the Filing of a Notice of Paternity.

The first comprehensive discussion of exceptions to the
requirement that a putative father file a notice of paternity is
contained in Ellis v. Social Services Dept., 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah
1980).

At the time Ellis was decided, the Adoption Statute did

not contain the "impossibility" exception cited in Point IA
above.

Factually, the natural mother and father were residents

of California and engaged to be married.

Two weeks prior to the

anticipated wedding, the mother terminated

the engagement.

However, both parties were aware of the pregnancy.

Several days

prior to the birth of the child, the natural mother left
California for Utah and arranged to place the child with Social
Services.

The baby was born on December 15, 1979 and the mother

signed a relinquishment on December 19, 1979.
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On December 21,

1979, an attorney representing the putative father contacted
Social Services and informed its agents and employees of the
putative father's intent to assert his parental rights.

JEd. at

1252-53.
Recognizing that a putative father's right to custody of his
illegitimate child is superior to all others, except the child's
mother, the Court held that the statute in question was void and
unenforceable as it relates to the facts in Ellis.
The statute in question provides that if the
putative father fails to file his notice of paternity
prior to the happening of certain events, he is
thereafter barred.
In the usual case, the putative
father would either know or reasonably should know
approximately when and where his child was born. It is
conceivable, however, that a situation may arise when
it is impossible for the father to file the required
notice of paternity prior to the statutory bar, through
no fault of his own.
In such a case, due process
requires that he be permitted to show that he was not
afforded a reasonable opportunity to comply with the
statute.
Id. at 1256.
Noting that Ellis was decided by the trial court on a
motion to dismiss, the Utah Supreme Court explicitly held that:
Plaintiff was not given an opportunity to
present evidence to show as a factual matter that he
could not reasonably have expected his baby to be
born in Utah. He should be afforded an opportunity
to make that showing. If he is successful in
showing that determination of his parental rights
was contrary to basic notions of due process, and
that he came forward within a reasonable time after
the baby's birth, he should be deemed to have complied
with the statute. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 1256.
The Court found that the assertion that the natural mother
left California, without advising the putative father, that she
16

declared the father to be unknown and, that she relinquished
custody within four days after birth, warranted a full factual
review.
The Court revisited the issue in Wells v. Children's Aide
Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984).

In Wells, the Supreme

Court reviewed the issue that had been fully tried at the trial
court level.

The putative father was advised prior to the birth

of the child that he needed to file an Acknowledgment
Paternity.

of

The father signed a form on September 18, but did not

mail it until September 23, the day of the birth and one day
before the natural mother relinquished custody.

The Department

of Vital Statistics did not receive document until September 30.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court which
had concluded that the father was denied a reasonable opportunity
to comply with the statute.

The Court held that the reasonable

opportunity standard applies only where it is "first shown that
it was impossible for the father to file through no fault of his
own."

Id., at 689.

In distinguishing Ellis and establishing that

it was not "impossible" for the father to file, the Court noted
that (1) the birth occurred in the same state as the fatherf s
residence; (2) neither the mother nor the agency were attempting
to prevent him from learning of the birth or asserting his
parental rights; (3) neither the mother nor the agency knew at
the time that the child was relinquished that the father was
seeking to or intending to assert his parental rights.

The Court

held that the putative father had contacted counsel, had been
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given copies of the required forms and could have filed the
document precluded a finding of "impossibility."

Ld. at 689-90.

Importantly, Wells was decided after a full evidentiary
hearing and a fair opportunity given to all parties to establish
their claims.
Next, the Court decided in Sanchez v. LPS Social Services,
680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984).

In Sanchez, the Supreme Court upheld

the application of the statute finding that (1) both parents were
Utah residents; (2) the mother indicated she was considering
adoption; (3) the parents attended a counseling session at LDS
Social Services; (4) the father visited the mother and child in
the hospital prior to the time the child was relinquished; (5)
the father knew of the pending adoption and did not protest the
mother's decision to place the child for adoption.
The Supreme Court reviewed the issue again in In re Adoption
of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986).

In that case, the

mother and father had lived together for three and a half years.
In June of 1994, the natural mother moved to Utah, while
pregnant.

Although relatives of the mother attempted to dissuade

contact with the father the parties conversed and in fact the
putative father came to Utah and spent time with the natural
mother.

The parties agreed to move to Arizona and get married.

While the putative father was in Arizona locating a job and a
place to live, the natural mother gave birth in Utah and
relinquished her parental rights.
discussed,

all parties

Although adoption had been

acknowledged
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the putative

father's

opposition to the adoption.

Upon learning of the adoption, the

putative father contacted a lawyer and took steps to set aside
the termination of his rights.

Id., at 687-88.

It is important to note that the trial court conducted a
full evidentiary hearing in Doe, supra and the court determined
that since the putative father knew where the natural mother was
residing, that the natural mother intended to place the child for
adoption

and

influences.
impossible
Paternity.

that

she was susceptible

to her relatives1

Accordingly the trial court held that it was not
for the putative

father to file his Notice of

Id. at 688.

In reversing the trial court's decision, the Utah Supreme
Court distinguished the facts in Doe from Wells and Sanchez.

The

Court found that (1) the putative father was not a resident of
Utah and had only visited for less than a week; (2) the child's
mother told the putative father that she would move to Arizona
and marry him; (3) all parties knew of the father's intent and
desire to rear the child.

Id. at 690. The Court summarized as

follows:
Where the father does not know of the need to
protect his rights, there is no "reasonable
opportunity" to assert or protect parental rights. In
such a case, the operation of the statute fails to
achieve the desired balance and raised serious due
process concerns . . . because of the clearly
articulated intent of the father to keep and rear the
child, the full knowledge of that intent on the part of
all involved, the representations made by the mother,
the actions of her family, the premature birth, and the
non-residency of the father coupled with his absence at
the time of birth, we cannot say that this was either a
usual case or that notice may be implied.
We,
therefore conclude that Appellant has successfully
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shown that the termination of his parental rights was
contrary to basic notions of due process and that he
came forward within a reasonable time after the baby's
birth (such that) he should be deemed to have complied
with the statute.
Finally, the issue was reviewed by the Utah Court of Appeals
in In re Adoption of W, 375 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah Ct. App.
1995).

In that case, the natural mother, who was a minor living

at home, was beaten by her parents because of her relationship
with the putative father.

The biological mother was taken to a

maternity home in Indiana by her parents and then to Las Vegas
two months later in December of 1993.

The putative father did

not know where the mother was located.

The putative father was

notified

of the birth and the pending

adoption in Utah in a

phone conversation in January of 1994.

However, the putative

father did not contact the adoptive parents until March 7, 1994
and took no action until May of 1994.

Again, however, a full

evidentiary hearing was held by the trial court.

^Ed. at 20-21.

The Court held that the failure of the putative father to
file the Notice of Paternity, after he knew of the pending Utah
adoption, precluded

a finding that it was impossible

putative father to comply with the statute.
C.

for the

_Id. at 23-24.

The Facts Established in this Case Entitle the
Appellant to the Reversal of Summary Judgment and
a Full Evidentiary Hearing.

The sole issue raised by this appeal is the propriety of
denying the Plaintiff a right to a full evidentiary hearing and
deciding the case by summary judgment.

If each of the cases

decided by the Utah Appellate Courts is reviewed and contrasted
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with the facts of this case, it is clear that the Plaintiff is
entitled to go to trial on the allegations set out in his
Complaint.
As discussed above, the Utah Supreme Court in Ellis held
that a putative father should be afforded an opportunity to make
a factual showing that he came forward within a reasonable time
after the baby's birth, that the termination of parental rights
was contrary to basic notions of due process and that he should
be deemed to have complied with the statute.

_Id. at 1256.

In Ellis, the Court found that the case should be remanded
for hearing based upon the fact that the natural mother left
California without advising the father; that the natural mother
declared the natural father to be unknown; and, that custody was
relinquished within four days after birth.

In this case,

everyone knew that the Plaintiff, Beltran, intended to raise the
child and would not consent or acquiesce in the adoption.
left California without advising the Plaintiff.

Allan

In fact, the

first set of documents presented to the Plaintiff were from the
California Social Services.

The Plaintiff, after being advised

of Allan's intent to place the child for adoption, immediately
filed an action in California and obtained a Restraining Order.
Those documents were in Allan's hands by November 7, 1994, a week
before

the

birth

of

relinquished her rights.

the

child

and

ten

days

before

she

The agents of LDS Social Services were

uncoroporative and in fact hung up on the Plaintiff.

No one

advised the Plaintiff of the requirement of filing the Notice of
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Paternity and the need for that document was conveniently omitted
from all correspondence by LDS Social Services or Allan.

The

Plaintiff herein was not advised of the child's birth or the
relinquishment until significantly later.

The facts in this case

are much stronger in supporting a finding of "impossibility" then
in Ellis.

Certainly, the Plaintiff is entitled to a full hearing

and the right to present testimony.
In Wells, supra, the Court found that the trial court
errored in finding "impossibility" because (1) the birth occurred
in the same state as the father's residence; (2) neither the
mother nor the agency were attempting to prevent him from
learning of the birth or asserting his parental rights; (3)
neither the mother nor the agency knew at the time that the child
was relinquished that the father was seeking to or intending to
assert his parental rights.

In contrast to Wells, the birth did

not occur in the same state as the father's residence.

The

mother and LDS Social Services attempted to prevent the Plaintiff
from learning of the birth or asserting his parental rights.
Neither LDS Social Services nor Allan informed the Plaintiff of
the birth and relinquishment even though his desire to establish
a relationship

with

the

child was known

to both.

The

correspondence of LDS Social Services provided a means for the
Plaintiff to waive his rights but did not explain the need for
filing a Notice of Paternity to preserve his rights.

According

to the standard set in Ellis, Plaintiff is entitled to prevail on
the merits.

Certainly, the Plaintiff is entitled to a hearing
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and the right to establish his case.
In contrast with Sanchez, supra both parents in this case
were California residents.

Although Allan indicated she was

considering adoption, the Plaintiff was adamant throughout that
he would not consent or acquiesce to an adoption.
never

attended

counseling

with

LDS

Social

The Plaintiff
Services

and

consistently informed its agents and employees of his intent not
to relinquish the child.

The Plaintiff in this case did not know

of the baby's birth and certainly did not visit the mother and
child in the hospital.

The Plaintiff had no knowledge of the

events that took place between November 14, 1994 (the birth of
the

baby)

and

November

17,

1994

the

date

of

Allan's

relinquishment.
The facts in this case are stronger than those which
warranted the Supreme Court's reversal of the trial court's
holding in Doe, supra.
Utah.

In this case, the Plaintiff was never in

Upon learning of Allan's departure to Utah, the Plaintiff

did everything that he thought necessary to preserve and protect
his rights.

He filed an action and obtained a Restraining Order

in California.
Social Services.

The Plaintiff immediately tried to contact LDS
The Plaintiff obtained legal counsel and filed

appropriate actions in Utah.

Most importantly, the Plaintiff, at

all times, manifested his intent to keep the child to the
natural mother, the agents and employees of LDS Social Services
in California and Utah and with members of the parties' families.
As it relates to the Court's holding in Doe, supra, the
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Plaintiff in this case took immediate action upon learning that
Allan was in Utah to give the child up for adoption.
Plaintiff did not wait for a period of months.

The

Instead, the

Plaintiff immediately filed an action in California and obtained
a Restraining Order.
In summary, the facts which entitle the Plaintiff to a
reversal of the Order granting summary judgment under the
existing case law in Utah are as follows.
1.

The Plaintiff and the natural mother are residents

of California.

Aside from the visit to Utah to give birth,

the natural mother has resided in California.
2.

The Plaintiff has never wavered in manifesting

a clear intent to maintain his parental rights with the
child.
3.

Allan submitted adoption papers to the Plaintiff

from the California LDS Social Services.

The Plaintiff

could reasonably conclude that any action the Plaintiff
was intending with regard to adoption would be conducted
in California.

The Plaintiff refused to sign any waiver

or consent and filled out only the relevant social and
medical histories.

Those forms clearly indicated that they

were applicable in situations in which the parties intended
to keep the child.
4.

Allan left for Utah without advising the Plaintiff

of the trip, its purpose or duration.
5.

When the Plaintiff learned of Allan's action, he
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prepared and filed a Complaint and obtained a Restraining
Order in California to establish his parental rights and
restrain Allan from leaving California.

The fact that Allan

left did not deprive the California Court of the right to
insist that Allan return to California*

The Plaintiff, in

keeping with the Courtf s practice of sending process by
mail and attaching a waiver for a defendant to sign
in lieu of personal service, sent all the documents to
Allan on November 3, 1994. Allan received the documents on
November 7, 1994 and did nothing to alert the Plaintiff or
the Court of her intended action.
6.

When the Plaintiff received the LDS Social Service

letter dated October 27, 1994, he responded in writing and
tried to contact the author of that letter who hung up on
him.

The Plaintiff continued to try and obtain information

from the LDS Social Services, which efforts were ignored.
LDS

Social

Services

and Allan, although knowing

the

Plaintiff's location and phone number, refused to advise him
of the baby's birth or the pending adoption.
7.

LDS Social Services, knowing of the Plaintiff's

response to Bekker's letter of October 27, 1994, failed to
advise the Plaintiff of the need to file a Notice of
Paternity or its intent to proceed in the adoption matter
in the Utah forum.
8.

All parties involved in this matter have known

since prior to the birth of the child, the intent of the
25

Plaintiff to establish and maintain a relationship with
his child.
POINT III: THE DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IS NOT DISPOSITIVE OF THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE AND
THE UTAH ADOPTION STATUTE AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS
OF THIS CASE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
A.

Utah Case Law Establishes that a Filing of a Notice of
Paternity is not Always Required to Preserve the Right
to Establish the "Impossibility" Exception,

The trial

court, in its decision, relied upon Utah Code

Annotated 78-30-4.13 (Supp. 1995) and the decision of the Utah
Court of Appeals, In the Matter of the Adoption of W, supra.

The

trial court reasoned that inasmuch as the plaintiff had made "no
efforts to file notice of his claim of paternity with the Utah
Department

of

Health"

the

plaintiff

was

precluded

from

establishing "impossibility" under the statute (R. 284-292).
The Utah Court of Appeals in In the Matter of the Adoption
of W, supra, held that inasmuch as the putative father did not
file the Notice of Paternity within ten days after finding out
that the child had been placed with an adoptive couple in Utah,
he could not take advantage of the "impossibility" exception in
the statute.

It is respectfully submitted that the ruling of the

Court of Appeals cannot be read as broadly as the trial court
intimated.

The ruling cannot stand for the proposition that the

failure to file a Notice of Paternity, under all circumstances,
acts as a bar to the establishment of "impossibility" under the
statute.

In In re W, supra, the putative father did not file his

Notice of Paternity
informed

that

for more than eight months after he was

the child was in Utah
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and was the subject of

adoption proceedings.

^Ed. at 24.

Arguably, the failure to file

the notice affected the notice that the relevant parties were
entitled

to

proceedings.

during

the

various

stages

of

the

adoption

However, as it relates to the facts of this case,

the filing of the notice of paternity is a moot issue in that
all parties and their representatives knew of the Plaintiff's
position and under any construction of the facts, the Plaintiff
could not reasonably have been expected to file a notice before
the

birth

of

the

child

or

before

the

natural

mother's

relinquishment is taken.
The Court in Ellis, supra, explicitly acknowledged that "a
statute fair upon its face may be shown to void and unenforceable
as applied."

:id. at 1256.

The Court then held that a situation

may arise where "it is impossible for a father to file a Notice
of Paternity prior to the statutory bar, through no fault of his
own.

In such a case, due process requires that he be permitted

to show that he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to
comply with the statute."

Idl. at 1256.

In Ellis, the Utah

Supreme Court held that if a putative father was successful in
showing that the termination of his parental rights was contrary
to basic notions of due process, and "that he came forward within
a reasonable time after the baby's birth, he should be deemed to
have complied with the statute."

JEd. at 1256.

Utah Code Annotated 78-30-4.8 (1994 as Amended) deviated
from the language in Ellis that established the prerequisites to
the

"impossibility" exception.
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The statute requires that a

putative father establish that it was not possible for him to
file a Notice of Paternity (prior to the birth of the child or
the time the child is relinquished to a licensed child placing
agency or prior to the filing of a Petition for Adoption); that
his failure was through no fault of his own; and, that he filed a
Notice of Paternity within ten days after it became possible for
him to file.
In essence, Ellis requires a father to "come forward within
a

reasonable

time

after

the

baby's

birth"

and

the

statute

requires an absolute filing of a Notice of Paternity within ten
days after it became possible

for him to file, regardless of

whether the delayed filing would have any effect on the facts of
the

case

or

the

notice

imparted

to

the

parties.

It

is

respectfully submitted that a putative father who is deemed to
"come forward within a reasonable time after the child's birth"
is entitled

to establish

the

"impossibility"

exception under

Ellis regardless of whether a Notice of Paternity is filed.

The

Court in Ellis reserves to the fact finder whether the father! s
efforts were reasonable and the filing of the Notice of Paternity
is only one element that should be considered.
B.

The Requirement that the Notice of Paternity be Filed
Within 10 Days After it Becomes Possible for the Father
to File does not Serve a Legitimate Purpose.

The Court in Wells, supra, established that the requirement
of filing a Notice of Paternity was constitutional and afforded
appropriate due process because:
. the state has a compelling interest in
speedily identifying those persons who will assume a
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parental role over newborn illegitimate children.
Speedy identification is important to immediate and
continued physical care and it is essential to early
and uninterrupted bonding between child and parents.
If infants are to be spared the injury and pain of
being torn from parents with whom they have begun the
process of bonding and is prospective parents are to
rely on the process in making themselves available for
adoption, such determinations must also be final and
irrevocable.
Id. at 206-207.
The Court in Wells held that "in the common cases" the
requirement
compelling

of personal
state

adoption matter.

notification

"would frustrate the

interest in the speedy determination" of
Id., at 207.

There is no question that in the

common case, the requirement that notices of paternity be filed
meets all of the due process requirements of the United States
and Utah Constitution.

However, the Utah Supreme Court has held

that there are circumstances when a putative father will be
allowed to circumvent the need for filing when it is impossible
for him to do so.

The issue then becomes whether the ten day

requirement or even the late filing serve any useful purpose at
all.
The present system allows an adoption placing agency or
adoptive parents to search a record for a Notice of Paternity and
if none, proceed with placement or adoption.

That system

fulfills the purpose of the adoption statute and fits within the
compelling state interests identified in Wells.

However, if a

fact situation is created where it is impossible for a father to
file a notice, it must be recognized that there are some cases
where a late filing of the Notice of Paternity serves no useful
29

purpose.

If the Notice of Paternity is not filed timely,

adoptive parents, natural parents, courts and adoption agencies
act in reliance thereon in placing children and processing
adoptions.

At that stage, the damage is done.

If a reviewing

Court finds that a father could not possibly file the required
notice, the late filing of that document serves no purpose.
Filings are checked prior to the entry of a final Decree of
Adoption (U.C.A. 78-30-4.8(5) (1995).

If it is impossible to

file a notice by that time, a tardy filing is of no use to
anyone.
Accordingly, there is no interest that is served by an
absolute requirement that a Notice of Paternity be filed within
ten days after it is possible.
provision.

No one can rely on that

Ten days after it becomes possible might be ten days

or months after an adoption is granted.

The key is that a

putative father be required to come forward as quickly as
reasonably possible.
Not only is the ten day requirement unreasonable but the
requirement that "coming forward" means only the filing of a
Notice of Paternity is also unreasonable.

Because a certificate

from the Department of Health regarding the filing of a Notice of
Paternity is necessary only when the final Decree of Adoption is
signed, adoptive parents, adoption agencies and the Courts are
not expected to check the record at any other time. Accordingly,
the most reasonable means of "coming forward" may be actual
notice to the parties and persons involved.
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That way, parties

can act quickly and decisively to resolve the issue instead of
relying on a late filing that no one may ever review.
It is respectfully submitted that whether or not a father
filed a Notice of Paternity and within what time frame is only
one

element

construction

of many

that must

be reviewed.

of Utah Code Annotated

The

78-30-4.8(3)

Amended) denudes the ruling of the Court in Ellis.

strict

(1994 as

Ellis stands

for the proposition that the parental rights of an unwed father
cannot be terminated when it is impossible for the father to
timely file a Notice of Paternity and the father acts quickly and
reasonably to establish his rights.

The Court held that to the

extent that the statute, as applied, violated the father's
rights, the due process rights of the natural father were
violated and the statute was therefore void and unenforceable.
The exception carved out in Ellis is restricted unreasonably, as
applied

to the facts of this case by the absolute

filing

requirement of a Notice of Paternity.
As

Justice Durham noted in the dissenting opinion in

Sanchez, supra "the test must be whether fundamental fairness
has been preserved in the application of the statute to a given
constellation of facts."

Id.

at 756. As argued hereinafter, the

strict statutory construction requiring the filing of a notice
within ten days after it becomes possible constitutes a violation
of the Plaintiff's due process rights under the Utah and United
States Constitution.
C.

The Requirement that a Notice of Paternity be Filed
W i t h i n Ten Days A f t e r it is P o s s i b l e
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is

Unconstitutional as Applied to the Facts of this
Case.
It is the Plaintiff's position that it was impossible for
him to file a Notice of Paternity prior to January of 1995 after
he became aware that the adoption was proceeding in Utah and that
California was not the relevant forum for the establishment or
termination of his parental rights.
Pursuant to the terms of the statute, U.C.A.

78-30-4.8(3)

(1994 as Amended), the Plaintiff was required to file a Notice of
Paternity ten days thereafter.

However, the filing of the notice

at that time would not have served
record

in this case establishes

any useful purpose.

that

the child was born

The
on

November 14, 1994, the relinquishment of the natural mother was
taken on November 17, 1994 (R. 183) and the Certificate of Search
for Acknowledgment of Paternity was made on November 16, 1994 (R.
181).
The search of the paternity records on November 16, 1994,
satisfies the requirements of the statute that:
. . . prior to its entering a final Decree of
Adoption, a certificate from the Department of Health,
signed by the state registrar of vital statistics,
stating that a diligent search has been made of the
registry of notices from putative fathers of children
born outside of marriage and that no filing has been
found pertaining to the child in question.
U.C.A. 78-30-4.8(5) (1994 as Amended).
The filing of a Notice of Paternity on November 17, 1994 or
thereafter would not have any effect on the facts of this case.
To the extent that the Notice of Paternity is relied upon by
natural or adoptive parents, adoption agencies or the Courts, the
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failure to file is not relevant after the search has been made
and a certificate of non-filing is prepared by the director of
health statistics.

Neither the Courts, adoption agencies nor

persons petitioning in adoption proceedings have any obligation
to recheck with the Department of Health.

If the Plaintiff had

filed in late November, December, 1994 or January of 1995, it
would have had no effect.

Instead, the Plaintiff in this case

took steps to provide the natural mother, the adoption agency and
adoptive parents of his intent to pursue his parental rights.
The

procedures

undertaken

by

the

Plaintiff

were

far

more

effective in providing actual notice to the parties involved.
The Utah

Supreme Court has carved

an exception

into the

requirement that putative fathers file notices of paternity.

The

Supreme Court has required a finding of impossibility through no
fault of the father and a requirement that he act reasonably in
establishing his claim.

As applied to the facts of this case, it

would violate "fundamental fairness" to review this case on the
basis of whether a useless late filing should have been made as
opposed to an evaluation of all of the other relevant indicia as
to whether the Plaintiff acted reasonably.
One final note should be made.

There is simply no way that

a factual determination of whether a filing was necessary and if
so, within what time frame, could disrupt the stated purpose of
the present
arbitrary

adoption

ten

day

statute.

period

The

cannot

reasonably

curtail damage or delay proceedings.
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statutory

creation of
be

expected

an
to

The ten day limit is not

connected with any of the procedure outlined in the adoption
statute and the late filing cannot reasonably be interpreted to
impart notice to any of the relevant parties.

A rational

approach to the exception carved out in Ellis requires that the
absolute requirement of filing within ten days after it becomes
possible not be strictly construed.

Although the Court has ruled

that strict compliance is reasonable (Sanchez, supra at 755), the
rulings have been made with respect to the overall scheme
incorporated in the adoption statute.

There is no useful purpose

for the strict construction of a ten day period that is
arbitrary, not tied to any adoption proceeding and is not likely
to impart notice to the relevant parties.
The best illustration of the lack of fundamental fairness
is created by assuming that the Plaintiff complied with the
statute.

If Plaintiff had filed the required notice in late

November or thereafter, none of the facts of this case would be
different.

However, if Plaintiff had failed to impart the notice

of his rights by other means, certainly the participants herein
could have claimed prejudice.
CONCLUSION
There are significant issues of fact that have been created
by the pleadings and affidavits filed in this case.

The

existence of those material issues of fact precludes the granting
of summary judgment.
The facts established by the Plaintiff in this case meet the
requirements set out in statute and case law for the application
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of the impossibility exception to the filing of a Notice of
Paternity.

The Plaintiff has established sufficient issues of

fact to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing at which time he
could establish that it was impossible for him to file a notice
within the required time frame and the impossibility was created
through no fault of his own.
A rational interpretation of Ellis, due process requirements
and the adoption

statute mandate a finding

that a strict

interpretation of the adoption statute and the requirement that a
notice be filed within ten days after it is possible is not
fundamentally

fair as applied to the facts of this case.

Accordingly, the fact finder should be allowed to consider all of
the facts, including the filing of a Notice of Paternity, to
determine if the Plaintiff took reasonable action in making his
claim.

The failure to file a Notice of Paternity within ten days

after it becomes possible should not be a bar to a putative
father's right to establish the impossibility exception carved
out in Ellis.
DATED this

4jJ** day of

1996.

ert L. Moody^
Robert
Attorney for Plain^ff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit 1
R u l i n g o f Judge Burningham d a t e d November 1 4 ,

1995

A/OV 1 5

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARIO G. BELTRAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 950400021

DENISE ALLAN; LDS SOCIAL
SERVICES, an agency of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and JOHN
DOES I through V,

RULING

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration (1995), on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court has
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, and upon being advised in the
premises, now makes the following:
RULING
1.

Plaintiff has made no efforts to file notice of his claim of paternity with the

Utah Department of Health,
2.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.13 (Supp. 1995) and because In the

Matter of the Adoption of W.. 275 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (1995), is directly on point,
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
3.
///

Plaintiffs Cross-motion for Summary Judgment is therefore DENIED.

4.

Pursuant to Rule 4-501 (3)(c)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration

(1995), Plaintiffs request for oral argument is DENIED; "the issue . . . governing the
granting [of summary judgment] has been authoritatively decided."
Counsel for Defendants is to prepare an order consistent with the terms of this ruling
and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court
for signature.
Dated this _Jj_ day of November, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

cc:

DAVID M. McCONKIE
MERRILL F. NELSON
KIRTON & McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104
ROBERT L. MOODY
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604

Ruling Page -2-
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District Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment
Dated November 30, 1995

FILED IN
„„.
4TH DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

h i 30 4 23 ?H 'SS
David M. McConkie (A2154)
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendants
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARIO G. BELTRAN,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 950400021
DENISE
ALLAN;
LDS
SOCIAL
SERVICES, an Agency of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and
JOHN DOES I through V,

Judge Guy R. Bumingham

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of
defendants Denise Allan and LDS Social Services. The adoptive parents, who joined the
action as Doe defendants, joined in defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff
subsequently filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and requested oral argument

on the motions.

The Court, having reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of

counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby orders as follows:
1. There is no material issue of fact.
2. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (a) plaintiff
has made no efforts to file a notice of claim of paternity with the Utah Department of
Health; (b) plaintiff is barred from asserting any interest in the child and has no right of
consent to the child's adoption, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.8 (1994 Supp.); and (c) the
recent case of In re Adoption of W., 275 U.A.R. 20 (Utah App. 1995), is directly on point
in rejecting plaintiffs legal claims.
3. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
4. Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
5. Plaintiffs request for oral argument is denied, pursuant to Rule 4-501(c)(b),
Code of Jud. Admin., because "the issue . . . governing the granting [of summary
judgment] has been authoritatively decided."
Dated this So_ day of November, ^ 9 g M *

#

lrningham>

-2-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed the foregoing ORDER this £ Pday
of November, 1995, in the United States mail, postage prepaid to the following:

Robert L. Moody, Esq.
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, UT 84604
Attorney for Plaintiff

Les F. England, Esq.
3760 South Highland Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Attorney for Mr. and Mrs. Doe

-3-

Robert L. Moody, No. 2302
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 373-2721
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MARIO G. BELTRAN,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Plaintiff,

:

v.
DENISE ALLAN; LDS SOCIAL
SERVICES, an Agency of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints;
and JOHN DOES I THROUGH V,
Defendant(s).

:
:

Case No. 960079-CA

:

I hereby certify that on this l/L

day of April, 1996, I mailed a true and correct

copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief, postage prepaid, to the following:
David M. McConkie, Esq.
Merrill K. Nelson, Esq.
Attorneys for Appellees
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1104
Les F. England, Esq.
Attorney for Adoptive Parents
P.O. Box 680845
Park City, UT 84068-0845

